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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section 
78A-4-103(2)( h). UTAH CODE ANN. (Supp. 2008). 
STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, ORDINANCES, 
AND REGULATIONS which are determinative or of central importance. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-l 12. (Supp. 2008) 
District court jurisdiction over certain termination of parental rights proceedings. 
(1) A district court has jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition to terminate parental 
rights in a child if the party who filed the petition is seeking to terminate parental rights 
in a child for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of the child. 
(2) A petition to terminate parental rights under this section may: 
(a) be joined with a proceeding on an adoption petition; or 
(b) be filed as a separate proceeding. 
(3) A court may enter a final order terminating parental rights before a final decree of 
adoption is entered. 
(4) (a) Nothing in this section limits the jurisdiction of a juvenile court relating to 
proceedings to terminate parental rights as described in Section 78A-6-103. 
(b) This section does not grant jurisdiction to a district court to terminate parental 
rights in a child if the child is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in a pending 
abuse, neglect, dependency, or termination of parental rights proceeding. 
(5) The district court may terminate a person's parental rights in a child if: 
(a) the person executes a voluntary consent to adoption, or relinquishment for 
adoption, of the child, in accordance with: 
(i) the requirements of this chapter; or 
(ii) the laws of another state or country, if the consent is valid and irrevocable; 
(b) the person is an unmarried biological father who is not entitled to consent to 
adoption, or relinquishment for adoption, under Section 78B-6-120 or 78B-6-121; 
(c) the person: 
(i) received notice of the adoption proceeding relating to the child under Section 78B-
6-110; and 
(ii) failed to file a motion for relief, under Subsection 78B-6-110(6), within 30 days 
after the day on which the person was served with notice of the adoption proceeding; 
(d) the court finds, under Section 78B-15-607, that the person is not a parent of the 
child; or 
(e) the person's parental rights are terminated on grounds described in Title 78A, 
Chapter 6, Part 5, Termination of Parental Rights Act. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMEN I S 
* • - , ^ ..( iN parental rights. Case 
law and the plain language of section 78B-6-112 supports the conclusion that the 
District Court has jurisdiction to terminate parental rights if the termination is 
pursuant to an adoption linlm; Ihl t ln v« IN i mm i I Im (h.it tin (erniinatiuii of 
,,.y,., j ^ i l t s p r o v i s i o n 0 f the Utah Adopt ion Act applies to fathers of children born 
in wedlock as well as unmarr ied biological fathers. The " law of the case" doctr ine 
and other sections in the Utah Adoption V i• i < 11 < I i m»i 11 c p 11 \ t 11 H • I) i s I r i c t ( ' o 11 rI uf 
jui IMIRIHHI 
II. Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate Due Process protection. Judge Hi lder ' s 
ruling fully complied with the provisions of the I Jtal i Adoption Act f In Sie\ erts 
waived ai ly i ight to i lotice ai id a 1: leai ii ig wl lei 11 le signed the waiver of his parental 
rights. Furthermore, Mr. Sieverts substantive due process rights were given sufficient 
protection. The question of whether Mr. Sieverts has standing in the adoption 
proceeding to testify regauliML. «IK ! ^ : iterests of hi rhiMivn IN- ii >l pmpu'K lu'lnr^ 
this court. 
III. This issue relating to the plain language of the rel inquishment statute is addressed 
in section I? as it is releVeilil fo ilu qik'siion id innsdirlioii 
I ' • s »> lating to children b o m in wedlock in applying the termination ol 
parental rights provisions in the Adoption Act is addressed in section I as it is relevant 
to the question of jurisdiction. 
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V. Section 78B-6-112 does not mandate or allow a judge to consider the best interests 
of children when terminating parental rights. The due process rights of the children 
were not violated when Mr. Sieverts' parental rights were terminaled. 
VI. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Mr. Sieverts did not 
meet his burden of producing enough evidence to establish the equitable claims he 
asserted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BASED ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANNO. §78B-6-
112 AND CASE LAW, THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MR. SIEVERTS. 
Based on prior case law and the plain language of Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-l 12, 
(Supp. 2008),1 Judge Hilder was correct when he held that he had jurisdiction to 
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts. ((Ruling of Judge Hilder, Feb. 19, 2008, No. 
073900653 (Hereinafter "Ruling") at 4)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness: "the propriety of the jurisdictional determination . . . 
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court." Franklin 
Convey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, f 8, 2 P.3d 451 (quoting State 
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). 
The analysis in this section will proceed as follows: (A) A summary of the 
statutory grants of jurisdiction to terminate parental rights; (B) Prior case law and section 
1
 Although most of the relevant provisions have been renumbered, citations will be made 
to current provisions, unless amendments have changed the statutory language. 
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78B-6-112 supports the conclusion that a district court has jurisdiction to terminate 
parental rights so long as the termination takes place to facilitate an adoption; (C) Judge 
Hilder was correct in holding that he did not need to look past the plain language of the 
Utah Adoption Act to determine that the District Court had jurisdiction to terminate the 
parental rights of Mr. Sieverts; (D) The "law of the case" doctrine and sections 78B-6-
135 and 76B-6-110 did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. 
A. A summary of the two avenues of jurisdiction for the termination of 
parental rights. 
There are two jurisdictional avenues for the termination of parental rights. See 
generally Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The first avenue 
is through the Termination of Parental Rights Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-501 to -704 
(Supp. 2008)), which gives original and exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court to 
"terminate all parental rights with respect to a parent" under enumerated circumstances. 
See §78A-6-507. The second avenue is through section 78B-6-112 of the Utah Adoption 
Act (§§ 78B-6-101 to -145) which "grants a district court jurisdiction to accept a 
relinquishment of parental rights only pursuant to an adoption." Fauver, 803 P.2d at 
1277. 
B. Prior case law and a reading of section 78B-6-112 supports the 
conclusion that a district court has jurisdiction to terminate parental rights so 
long as the termination takes place to facilitate an adoption. 
1. The District Court was correct in concluding that Utah Code Anno. 
§78B-6-112 grants jurisdiction to terminate parental rights so long as 
the purpose of the termination is to facilitate the adoption of a child. 
4 
Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-l 12 grants jurisdiction to a district court to terminate 
parental rights if the purpose of the termination is to facilitate an adoption. (Supp. 2008). 
Section 78B-6-112(1) provides, "[a] district court has jurisdiction to hear and decide a 
petition to terminate parental rights in a child if the party who filed the petition is seeking 
to terminate parental rights in a child for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of the 
child." Therefore, as long as the party who filed the petition wants to terminate the 
parental rights of an individual to facilitate the adoption of a child, the district court has 
jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights. 
In the instant case, the petition to terminate parental rights was filed for the 
purpose of facilitating the adoption of the children of Mrs. Messerich by Mr. Messerich. 
The Petition to Determine Parental Rights and the Adoption Petition were filed on the 
same day, April 30, 2007. ((Tentative Ruling and Request for Additional Briefing 
(Hereinafter "Tent. Rul.") No. 073900653, Oct. 30, 2007 at 4-5)). Therefore, Judge 
Hilder did not err by holding that the termination was sought to facilitate the adoption of 
the children and therefore that the district court had jurisdiction over the termination 
proceeding. 
Although the termination proceedings were separate from the adoption 
proceeding, Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-l 12(2) explicitly states that "[a] petition to 
terminate parental rights under this section may: (a) be joined with a proceeding on an 
adoption petition; or (b) be filed as a separate proceeding. (Supp. 2008). That statute 
((originally enacted as section 78-30-7.1 (Ch. 196, Laws of Utah, 2007)) went into effect 
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April 30, 2007, the same day the Adoption Petition and the Petition to Determine Parental 
Rights were filed. 
2. Case law supports the District Court's holding that the Utah 
Adoption Code grants jurisdiction to a District Court to terminate 
parental rights so long as the purpose of the termination is to facilitate 
the adoption of a child. 
Case law also supports Judge Hilder's holding that the district court has 
jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights so long as the party seeking to 
terminate parental rights is filing the petition to facilitate an adoption. For example, in 
the case of In Re Adoption ofB. W.G., the uncle and aunt of B.W.G. (who was about 
twelve years old at the time) sought to terminate the parental rights of B.W.G.'s mother 
and adopt the child. 2007 UT App 278,13, 167 P.3d 1099. The district court terminated 
the parental rights of B.W.G.'s mother because "'[B.W.G.] was neglected or abused,' and 
Mother 'is an unfit or incompetent parent' who 'has failed to make parental 
adjustments.'" Id. at j^ 3. On appeal, this Court held that a district court has subject 
matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights as long as the termination is ancillary to an 
adoption proceeding, fflf 7- 8. 
Also, in Fauver v. Hansen, the court held that the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to terminate parental rights because there was no adoption proceeding. 803 
P.2d 1275, 1277-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "Here, no adoption petition was ever filed and 
no adoption decree was ever entered, so the district court was never empowered to 
dissolve the father's parental rights and obligations." Id. at 1277. In the instant case, an 
6 
adoption petition was filed at the same time as the petition to determine parental rights, so 
the district court had jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights. 
For reasons of administrative convenience, it makes sense for the district court to 
have jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights if it is pursuant to an adoption. If 
the proceedings are held together, the judge can make all of the necessary findings 
regarding termination, adoption, and the best interests of the children. 
C. Judge Hilder was correct in holding that he did not need to look past the 
plain language of the Utah Adoption Act to legislative intent to determine 
whether the district court had jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of 
a father of children born in wedlock. 
Judge Hilder considered the issue of whether the Utah Adoption Act gave the 
district court jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of fathers of children born in 
wedlock and he correctly determined that the plain language of the Adoption Act 
conferred that jurisdiction. Judge Hilder held that the Adoption Act applies to married 
fathers, stating, "a review of the adoption code reveals numerous sections that affect not 
only unmarried biological fathers, but the rights of various parties involved in adoption 
proceedings including the birth mother, married biological fathers, unmarried biological 
father, [sic] and guardians. . . . Minor parent may include birth mother, married father, or 
unmarried biological father); UCA §§ 78-30-4.13 and 78-30-4.14 (sections on notice and 
consent) apply to birth mothers married fathers, agencies, guardians, arid unmarried 
biological fathers)." (Ruling at 4). 
One issue Judge Hilder did not expiessly consider, but which is relevant to 
whether the legislature intended the Utah Adoption Act to apply to the fathers of children 
7 
born in wedlock is the issue of Equal Protection. U.S. CONST, amend XIV. If applied to 
the mothers and fathers of children born in wedlock, section 78B-6-124 may be seen as 
requiring separate procedures for mothers and fathers of children born in wedlock and 
providing greater protection for mothers. Classifications based on gender are subject to 
close judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, (see e.g. Mississippi University 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1981). In Hogan, the court held that: 
the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their 
gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" 
for the classification. [] The burden is met only by showing at least that the 
classification serves "important governmental objectives, and that the 
discriminatory means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives." 
Id. at 723 (citations omitted). 
In order for a birth mother to voluntarily relinquish parental rights, she must sign 
the relinquishment before a judge, a person appointed by a judge to take relinquishments, 
or a person authorized by child-placing agency to take relinquishments. § 78B-6-124(1). 
For any other person to terminate parental rights, including fathers, the only requirement 
is that the relinquishment be signed before a Notary Public or certain other specified 
individuals. §§ 78B-6-124(3); 78B-6-120. 
Section 78B-6-124 does not violate Equal Protection because a "birth mother" 
applies to a mother whose child is born out of wedlock and does not apply to a mother of 
a child born in wedlock. Therefore, mothers and fathers of children bom in wedlock are 
afforded the same procedure for the voluntary termination of parental rights, which is 
stated in sections 78B-6-124(3) and 78B-6-120. That procedure consists of signing; a 
8 
relinquishment before a Notary Public or certain other specified individuals. §§ 78B-6-
124(3); 78B-6-120. The difference in the treatment of birth mothers and mothers of 
children born in wedlock would be subject to rational basis review under an Equal 
Protection analysis, and could be justified as rational because birth mothers are often 
subject to greater pressures in the decision of whether to relinquish parental rights in a 
child. 
D. The "law of the case" doctrine and Utah Code Anno. §§78B-6-135 and 
76B-6-110 did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction. 
1. The "law of the case" doctrine did not deprive Judge Hilder of 
jurisdiction. 
The "law of the case" doctrine does not apply to deprive Judge Hilder of 
jurisdiction because the issue that Judge Hilder decided was not identical to the issue 
Judge Peuler decided. Judge Peuler refused to recognize the termination of Mr. Seiverts' 
parental rights because termination can only occur in the context of an adoption 
proceeding and because it would not be in the best interest of the children to leave them 
without a father figure for the interim period of time. (Tent. Rul. at 4.) Judge Hilder held 
that he had jurisdiction to terminate parental rights under the Utah Adoption Act because 
the termination of parental rights was for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of the 
children. (Ruling at 3-4.) The issues that the judges ruled on are distinct and separate. 
The Utah Supreme Court described the "law of the case" doctrine as follows: 
We have repeatedly indicated that one district court judge cannot overrule 
another district court judge of equal authority. This branch of what is generally 
termed the "law of the case" doctrine has evolved to avoid the delays and 
difficulties that arise when one judge is presented with an issue identical to one 
which has already been passed upon by a coordinate judge in the same case. 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946-47 (Utah 1987). 
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The court went on to quote former section 78-7-19: "nothing in this section applies 
to . . . motions refused with liberty to renew the same." The motion refused by Judge 
Peuler was refused with liberty to renew the motion once an adoption proceeding was 
filed. Therefore, the "law of the case" doctrine would not apply to deprive Judge Hilder 
of jurisdiction. 
2. Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-135 did not prevent the district court from 
having proper jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. 
Mr. Sieverts also argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts because before an adoption can occur, "the 
law requires that the children reside in the home with the proposed stepfather for at least 
one year. See U.C.A. § 78-30-14(7)(b)." Br. of Appellant at 12. However, that law had 
been superseded by section 78-30-14(7)(b) (now 78B-6-135(7)(b) (Supp. 2008)), which 
went into effect April 30, 2007, the same day that the termination petition and the 
adoption petition were filed. That section states the one year requirement for step-parent 
adoptions, and then adds the clause "unless, based on a finding of good cause, the court 
orders that the final decree of adoption may be entered at an earlier time." See §78-30-
i 
14(7)(b) (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the one year requirement for step-parent adoptions 
was not an absolute rule and would not prevent the filing of an adoption petition prior to 
the one year anniversary of the marriage. 
3. Utah Code Anno. §76B-6-110 did not prevent the district court from 
having proper jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. 
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Mr. Sieverts also quoted section 78-30-11 for the proposition that parental rights 
are not terminated until the final decree of adoption is entered. Appellant's Br. at 13. 
This section would appear to give Mr. Sieverts the right to notice of the adoption 
proceedings under 76B-6-110. (Supp. 2008). However, the provisions cited by Mr. 
Sieverts were not in effect at the time the termination and adoption petitions were filed. 
An amendment to the statute took effect April 30, 2007, the day the adoption and 
termination petitions were filed. The statute now 78B-6-138, provides, 
A birth parent of an adopted child is released from all parental duties toward and 
all responsibilities for the adopted child, and has no further rights with regard to 
that child at the earlier of: 
(1) the time the parent's parental rights are terminated; or 
(2) the time the final decree of adoption is entered. 
Therefore, it is clear that all of Mr. Seiverts' parental rights were terminated at the 
time of the order terminating his parental rights and that he did not have the right to 
notice of the adoption proceedings, as ordered by Judge Hilder. (Order at 1.) 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH DUE 
PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND THE DISTRICT COURT MADE NO 
DETERMINATION REGARDING MR. SIEVERTS STANDING IN THE 
ADOPTION PROCEEDING. 
A. Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate due process protection. 
The District Court's rulings were perfectly consistent with the procedures 
provided in the Utah Adoption Act and afforded Mr. Sieverts adequate Due Process 
protection. Judge Hilder terminated Mr. Sieverts parental rights based on the Waiver, 
Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father . (Tent. Rul. at 5). In his brief, Mr. Sieverts 
argues that he was not afforded adequate Due Process, (Br. of Appellant at 1, 9, 12, 25, 
11 
26), including notice, (Br. of Appellant at 7, 10, 25, 26), and a hearing, (Br. of Appellant 
at 6, 12, 23), before his parental rights were terminated. However, when Mr. Sieverts 
signed the waiver, he waived whatever procedural protections he otherwise might have 
been afforded. The analysis in the section will proceed as follows, (1) Mr. Sieverts was 
afforded adequate procedural due process; (2) Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate 
protection of his substantive due process rights. 
1. Mr, Sieverts was afforded adequate procedural due process. 
Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate procedural due process in the termination of 
his parental rights. Utah courts have elaborated the requirements of due process in the 
context of parental rights: 
it is well-settled that "[t] he fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. " 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96S.Ct. 893, 47L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) 
(quotations and citation omitted). In the context of parental rights, n[d]ue process 
requires that a parent be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard by 
submitting testimony herself and by witnesses. "In re W.S., 939 P.2d 196, 202 
(Utah Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citation omitted). 
State ex rel. S.H., 2007 UT App 8, % 21, 155 P.3d 109 (UT 2007). 
Furthermore, due process requires that the facts supporting termination must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence: 
In termination of parental rights proceedings, "the court shall... require the 
petitioner to establish the facts by clear and convincing evidence." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-406(3); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 
S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ("Before a State may sever 
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process 
requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing 
evidence."). 
E.B. v. State, 2002 UT App 267,120, 53 P.3d 958. 
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Although the cases quoted above state that Due Process generally requires notice 
and a hearing before parental rights are terminated, those cases deal with involuntary 
termination and not voluntary termination. Mr. Sieverts has not cited any cases, and we 
are not aware of any cases dealing with the Due Process requirements for terminating the 
parental rights of fathers of children born in wedlock under the Utah Adoption Act. 
There are, however, Utah cases dealing with the termination of parental rights under the 
Termination of Parental Rights Act. ((Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-501 to -704 (Supp. 
2008)). 
Under section 78A-6-507(l) of the Termination of Parental Rights Act, a 
voluntary relinquishment must be given under oath before a judge or "a public officer 
appointed by that court." Also, under 78A-6-507(l), the judge or officer must "certify to 
the best of that person's information and belief that the person executing the consent or 
relinquishment has read and understands the consent or relinquishment and has signed it 
freely and voluntarily." Id. In addition, before parental rights can be terminated based on 
a voluntary relinquishment, the court must determine that termination of parental rights is 
in the best interests of the child. § 78A-6-507(5). 
However, if the Utah Adoption Act applies to fathers of children born in wedlock, 
Mr. Sieverts received all of the procedural protections to which he was entitled. There is 
no provision in the Utah Adoption Act which requires that the father be given notice of 
the hearing in which his parental rights are terminated and no provision which requires 
his attendance at any hearing. Before his parental rights can be terminated, the Utah 
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Adoption Act merely requires that he sign a waiver before a Notary Public or certain 
other specified persons. §§ 78B-6-120, -124. 
Even if Mr. Sieverts was entitled to notice and a hearing to comply with Due 
Process, he waived whatever process he was entitled to receive when he signed the 
waiver of his parental rights. Due Process protections can be waived, as when those 
under arrest waive their Miranda rights. When Mr. Sieverts signed the waiver, he waived 
his right to all parental rights, including the right to contest the adoption and have notice 
of the adoption proceedings. 
(i) Due Process does not require the right to be appointed 
counsel in this instance. 
Besides notice and a hearing, Due Process sometimes requires appointment of 
counsel for those unable to pay. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the court 
held although Due Process requires the appointment of counsel in certain proceedings 
terminating parental rights, appoint of counsel is not universally required: 
neither can we say that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in 
every parental termination proceeding. We therefore adopt the standard found 
appropriate in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and leave the decision whether due process 
calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination 
proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of 
course, to appellate review. 
452 U.S. 18,31-31(1981). 
Furthermore, in In Re Adoption ofB. W. G., the court decided that parental rights 
can be terminated in District Court without providing the opportunity for indigent parents 
to be appointed counsel: 
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A statutoiy right to counsel therefore exists for termination proceedings filed in 
juvenile court pursuant to the Termination Act, but no similar statutory right exists 
when an adoption petition is filed in district court pursuant to the Adoption Act. As 
we recently explained, the Adoption Act and the juvenile code are separate, self-
standing statutory schemes, and the Adoption Act does not incorporate, in 
wholesale fashion, the provisions of the juvenile code. See generally In re B.B.G., 
2007 UTApp 149, 160 P.3d 9. This is certainly true of the statutory right to 
counsel contained exclusively in the juvenile code. 
2007 UT App 278,1j 3, 167 P.3d 1099. 
2. Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate protection of his substantive 
due process rights. 
The district court did not violate Mr. Seiverts' substantive due process rights when 
his parental rights were terminated. Mr. Sieverts states that the termination of parental 
rights deprived him of "developing a relationship and bond with his children and 
enjoying the love and affection that comes with such relationships." Appellant's Br. at 
25. In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court stated that "the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children" is protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, which "'provides heightened protection against government 
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.'" 530 U.S. 57, 65 
(2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997)). If the 
government infringes on a fundamental right, the court will apply strict scrutiny in 
reviewing the governmental action, (see e.g. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995)). In order to pass strict scrutiny review, the governmental action must be 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Id. 
In this case, one of the important objectives of the Utah Adoption Act is to provide 
"permanent and stable homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner." 78B-6-
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102(5)(a). Seeln re Adoption of F.,26\Jtah2d255,262948S'P.2d 130, 134(1971) 
(absent a guarantee of finality individuals may be more reluctant to adopt if a "consenting 
parent is permitted to arbitrarily charge [sic] her mind and revoke the consent"). The 
goal of permanency is furthered if waivers of parental rights are not subject to revocation. 
Furthermore, it was important to Mrs. Messerich to have the waiver so that Mr. Sieverts 
would not be able to contest an adoption, custody, or parental rights in the future. Such 
waivers are sometimes a part of settlement agreements and should be upheld as reflecting 
the bargain agreed to by the parties. All of these interests are compelling and therefore, 
the ruling of the District Court should be upheld. 
B. The District Court did not hold that Mr. Sieverts did not have standing in 
the adoption proceeding and that issue is not properly before this Court. 
Mr. Sieverts asserted in point II of his brief that he has standing to testify 
regarding the best interests of his children in the adoption proceeding. Br. of Appellant at 
13-15, 19-20. However, the standing issue is not before this Court because the 
proceeding below was a proceeding to terminate parental rights and not an adoption 
proceeding. 
Judge Hilder did not make any findings or rulings regarding Mr. Sieverts standing 
to be heard at the adoption proceeding. Judge Hilder did order that the rights of Mr. 
Sieverts "are forever waived, surrendered, terminated or forfeited; including, the right to 
notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the children and the 
right to consent or refuse to consent to the adoption of the children." Judge Hilder's 
Order, No. 073900653 (hereinafter "Order"). However, this is not the same as ruling that 
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Mr. Sieverts did not have standing to be heard at the adoption hearing regarding the best 
interests of the children. Although Mr. Sieverts would likely have Schoolcraft standing 
to testify regarding the best interests of his children in the adoption proceeding, that issue 
is not before this court. In re J.W.F. (Schoolcraft), 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DID NOT LOOK 
BEYOND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE RELINQUISHMENT STATUTE 
WHEN IT APPLIED THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH ADOPTION ACT TO MR. SIEVERTS. 
As this issue is pertinent to the question of whether the district had jurisdiction to 
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts, it was addressed in Section I, supra. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT APPLIED THE 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROVISIONS IN THE UTAH 
ADOPTION ACT TO MR. SIEVERTS, A FATHER OF CHILDREN BORN IN 
WEDLOCK. 
As this issue is pertinent to the question of whether the district had jurisdiction to 
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts, it was addressed in Section I, supra. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN BEFORE TERMINATING THE 
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MR. SIEVERTS. 
As section 78B-6-112 of the Utah Adoption Act gives the District Court 
jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of children born in wedlock, Judge Hilder was 
correct in holding that he was not required to inquire into the best interests of the children 
before terminating the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts. 78B-6-112 (Supp. 2008); (Ruling 
at 5.) (See section I. for a discussion of the jurisdiction question). 
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The rights of the children were not violated when the district court did not 
consider their best interests before terminating the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts. The 
relationships between parents and children are protected by Due Process. 
"The Supreme Court has long recognized family relationships as one of the 
liberties protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 
Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1371\ 1383 (10th Cir.1989); see also Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977). 
ff
 The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard yat a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '"Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 'For 
this reason, some kind of hearing is generally required before a person is deprived 
of a protected interest. . . ." Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1385. 
State Ex. Rel O.C., 2005 UT App 563, \ 25, 127 P.3d 1286 (parallel citations omitted). 
Although a hearing regarding the best interests of the children is generally 
required, a court is authorized under the Utah Adoption Act to terminate parental rights 
without considering the best interests of the children. 78B-6-112 (Supp. 2008). In the 
case of In the Matter of the Adoption ofK. C.J., the court stated that an infant born out of 
wedlock may have a substantive due process rights in the relationship with the biological 
father, and thus a hearing would be required before termination of parental rights: 
"Denying K.CJ. a relationship with her biological father, with all of the consequences 
that such denial will entail, should take place only upon the district court's appraisal of all 
potentially relevant legal and factual considerations. Without T.C.'s participation in at 
least the initial stages of this proceeding, that cannot properly happen." 2008-UT-
R0502.003, slip op. % 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). The K.C. 1 case can be distinguished 
from the present case inasmuch as K.C.J., the biological father had not signed a waiver of 
parental rights. Individuals have the liberty to give up rights protected by substantive due 
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process if they desire and that is what Mr. Sieverts did when he signed the waiver of 
parental rights and consented to the future adoption. 
VI. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT 
THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND QUASI-ESTOPPEL, 
WAIVER AND LACHES DO NOT PREVENT ENFORCEMENT OF 
APPELLANT'S RELINQUISHMENT. 
Judge Hilder did not abuse his discretion when he held that Mr. Sieverts did not 
establish that the equitable doctrines of equitable estoppels, quasi-estoppel, waiver, and 
laches operated to prevent the termination of his parental rights. Issues based on 
equitable principles are "mixed questions of fact and law; therefore, we grant broadened 
discretion to the findings of the trial court." U.S. Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security 
Investment, LTD., 2002 UT 14, Tf 11, 40 P.3d 586. 
Judge Hilder found that Mr. Sieverts did not put forward adequate evidentiary 
support to establish any of his equitable claims: "Mr. Sieverts' estoppel claims are 
foreclosed by the lack of any evidence of inconsistent statements, acts or admissions by 
petitioners...Moreover, Mr. Sieverts has advanced no evidence or persuasive argument 
that he relied to his detriment upon petitioners' alleged representations or actions when 
he signed his unequivocal relinquishment. " Ruling, at 6. Judge Hilder did not abuse his 
discretion when he denied Mr. Seiverts' equitable claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court had jurisdiction under the plain language of Utah Code Anno. 
§78B-6-l 12 and case law to terminate Mr. Seiverts' parental rights because the purpose 
of the termination proceeding was to facilitate the adoption of the children of Mrs. 
Messerich by Mr. Messerich. Mr. Sieverts and his children received the protections of 
due process as Judge Hilder's ruling was perfectly consistent with the Utah Adoption Act 
and because Mr. Seiverts waived whatever process he was entitled to when he signed the 
waiver. Furthermore, Judge Hilder did not abuse his discretion when he held that Mr. 
Seiverts did not meet his burden of producing enough evidence to establish the equitable 
claims he asserted. We ask this Court to uphold the District Court's termination of Mr. 
Seiverts' parental rights. 
Dated this A day of February, 2009. 
iDY S. LUDLOW 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /-* day ofPcbmaTy, 2009,1 caused to be mailed, 
by deposit in the United States Mail, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following: 
JOSHUA F. KING, ESQ. 
KING & KING 
330 North Main Street 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
•&L 
c, ^ v,^alA3si3tant-
21 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A: Order of April 30, 2007 
Exhibit B: Tentative Ruling of October 30, 2007 
Exhibit C: Ruling of February 19, 2008 
22 
EXHIBIT A 
Gregory P. Hawkins (#4485) 
HAWKINS AND SORENSEN. LC 
5250 South Commerce Drive, Suite 101 
Murray, Utah 34107 
Phone: 801-747-3390 
Fax: 801-261-5199 
Attorney for Petitioners 
'O'ofrt S&> 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of 
Rex Bryant Falkenrath Sieverts, Andrew 
Marcus Falkenrath Sieverts, Reagan 
Elisabeth Falkenrath Sieverts and 
Orion Jeremy Falkenrath Sieverts, 
Minor Children, 
Brian James Messerich and 
Annika Falkenrath Messerich, 
Petitioners. 
ORDER 
Civil No. (9l3loo6rt 
Judge 
This matter came before the Court on the Petition to Determine Parental Rights 
and pursuant to UCA 78-30-4.24. The Court has reviewed the Petition and the exhibits 
attached thereto, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Affidavit and 
Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father is valid and pursuant to UCA 78-
30-4.11 et seq., the rights of Brandon Jeremy Sieverts are forever waived, 
surrendered, terminated or forfeited; including, the right to notice of any judicial 
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the children and the right to consent or 
refuse to consent to the adoption of ths-children. 
DATED this 3° 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS 
AN ORIGINAL D0CUM ' 
THIRD DISTRICT 
COUNTY. STATE OF U 
A20679 rare 
DEPUTY C( 
EXHIBIT B 
??LE5 8SCTmSTCSil8T 
_ThirJ Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT1 
OCT so ?wn IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SfcLTijfcKEGOl 
By. Deputy Cl 
In the Matter of: : TENTATIVE RULING AND REQUEST 
FOR ADDITIONAL BRIEFING 
REX BRYAN FALKENRATH SIEVERTS, : 
ANDREW MARCUS FALKENRATH SIEVERTS, CASE NO. 073900653 
REGAN ELISABETH FALKENRATH : 
SIEVERTS and ORION JEREMY 
FALKENRATH SIEVERTS, : Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Minor Children, : 
BRIAN JAMES MESSERICH and 
ANNIKA FALKENRATH MESSERICH, 
Petitioners. 
This matter is before the Court in an unusual posture, and one which 
presents difficult emotional issues, and perhaps one difficult legal 
issue. Because I find that most of the issues can be resolved 
definitively from the record, but I am nevertheless left with the 
question of the application of the existing statutory law to a stepparent 
adoption, as outlined below, I am requesting additional briefing from 
counsel before I finally determine the matter. 
BACKGROUND 
I am addressing the issue of the effect of Brandon Sieverts' 
Affidavit and Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father (the 
"Waiver"), in the context of the captioned action, but there is also a 
companion case; namely, the divorce action between Mr. Sieverts and his 
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former wife, Annika Falkenrath Sieverts (now known as Annika Falkenrath 
Messerich), case number 054904414. I will, of necessity, refer to both 
cases. 
I must first explain my involvement in this matter. Both cases are 
assigned to my colleague, the Honorable Sandra Peuler, who has handled 
all the issues in the divorce case, along with Commissioner Evans. I 
have had no involvement in that case. 
The Decree of Divorce between Mr. Sieverts and Ms. Messerich was 
signed by Judge Peuler on August 26, 2005, and entered in the Registry 
of Judgments on August 29, 2005. 
Less than one month later, on September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts 
signed the Waiver regarding his four children. On that same date, Mr. 
Sieverts signed a Stipulation to modify the divorce Decree (before a 
notary public), which Stipulation incorporated the Waiver of Rights and 
requested the Court acknowledge the relinquishment, but nevertheless 
preserved the children's right to support prospectively. 
On October 14, 2005, Judge Peuler rejected the Stipulation and 
denied the request for modification. She stated two cogent reasons for 
her refusal. First, Judge Peuler noted that, * [a] relinquishment of 
parental rights may occur only in the District Court in the context of 
an adoption proceeding. It may not occur in a divorce action." There 
was no adoption proceeding pending in October, 2005. The effect of Judge 
Peuler's first conclusion was that she had no jurisdiction to act on any 
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termination of rights. Even if the modification request was not 
requesting termination at that time, Judge Peuler provided a second 
reason for declining to approve the Stipulation; namely, her 
determination that it did not appear to be in the best interests of the 
children to leave them without a father figure for any interim period 
between a termination or relinquishment of rights, and an adoption by a 
stepparent. (I suggest that the Minute Entry to which I have just 
referred is the one Mr. Sieverts was citing, but which petitioners in 
this action have inadvertently confused with Judge Peuler's Minute Entry, 
dated July 26, 2006, denying Mr. Sieverts' Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief 
from Judgment.) 
The next activity also occurred in the divorce case; namely, Mr. 
Sieverts' Rule 60(b) Motion referred to above. After an exchange of 
Affidavits and argument before Commissioner Evans, the Commissioner 
recommended that the Motion be denied. Mr. Sieverts filed a timely 
Objection to that recommendation, and Judge Peuler ultimately held three 
days of evidentiary hearings regarding the Motion, resulting in her 
Minute Entry of July 26, 2006, denying the Motion. 
Although the Motion is not part of the present case, it certainly 
is helpful to me in identifying a pattern of conduct by Mr. Sieverts 
whereby he enters into agreements, signs waivers and other documents, and 
then seeks to avoid the consequences of his actions. At this point, it 
is sufficient to say that Judge Peuler rejected all of Mr. Sieverts' 
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claims following extensive evidence and arguments. 
What was not clear in the divorce case, but is apparently 
uncontested, is that both at the time that Mr. Sieverts signed the Waiver 
of his rights and the Stipulation to Modify the Decree, as well as at the 
time of the filing of the Rule 60(b) Motion, there was, in fact, no 
prospective stepparent identified by Ms. Messerich. It is undisputed 
that all of the negotiations between the parties to the divorce 
(sometimes referred to herein as the "mother" and the "father" for ease 
of reference), were entered into in contemplation of future circumstances 
that may or may not arise. 
There is no other activity in the divorce case that is relevant to 
my determination. I do not know the precise date when Mr. Messerich came 
into the picture, neither do I have a marriage date, but ±z is undisputed 
that subsequent to the divorce, the mother has married Brian Messerich. 
On April 30, 2007, this action was filed as a Petition to Determine 
Parental Rights. The Court's records indicate that a separate action, 
case number 072900213, was filed as an adoption proceeding on the same 
date by Brian and Annika Messerich. That action is presently assigned 
to Judge John Paul Kennedy, and is not before me at this time. 
The Petition to Determine Parental Rights was assigned to Judge 
Peuler, the same Judge who is assigned to the divorce action between the 
mother and father. In a not uncommon circumstance, counsel for the 
petitioner sought entry of an Order Terminating Rights, based on the 
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existing Affidavit and Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal 
Father, signed by Mr. Sieverts in 2005. On April 30, 2007, Judge Peuler 
was apparently unavailable to review the document. At that time, Judge 
Peuler was the Presiding Judge of this District, and I was the Associate 
Presiding Judge. The Petition and proposed Order was brought to me in 
my capacity as Associate Presiding Judge, and I signed the Order based 
on the Waiver executed by Mr. Sieverts. On or about June 6, 2007, I 
received a short letter from Mr. Sieverts, objecting to the termination 
of his parental rights. This letter was the first time I became aware 
of either the divorce action, or Judge Peuler's prior determination in 
2005. As my Minute Entry of June 10, 2007, indicates, I consulted 
briefly with Judge Peuler, and we agreed that because I signed the Order, 
I should consider any Objection to the Order. The Minute Entry also 
indicates that I chose to treat the letter as a Motion to Reconsider or 
Vacate the Order. This history brings us to the present state. 
DISCUSSION 
After I agreed to consider Mr. Sieverts* Objection, he retained 
counsel, and both sides have briefed the issue before the Court. After 
a delay, oral argument was heard on August 29, 2007, and I took the 
matter under advisement. 
Both the briefing, and the argument, highlight for me the unusual, 
if not perhaps unique, posture in which this case is now presented. Both 
in the pleadings and at argument, counsel for petitioners (the mother and 
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her new husband) has urged that both statutory and case law is 
unequivocal, and that a relinquishment, signed knowingly and in 
conformance with the statutory requirements, >xmay not be revoked." That 
is certainly the statutory language. Utah Code Ann., § 78-30-4.20. 
Counsel for Mr. Sieverts has acknowledged the existence of the 
statute, but has argued for exceptions. In his Memoranda, counsel raised 
the equitable doctrines of waiver by acquiescence, estoppel and laches. 
In argument, counsel also referenced the possibility of fraud as a 
defense, while acknowledging that Utah Code Ann., § 78-30-4.15(2), 
appears to bar the defense of fraud.1 
It is clear that, at least until the enactment of statutory bars to 
revoking consent, fraud, duress, or undue influence may have been 
sufficient to support an argument for revocation. Petitioners argue that 
the case law supporting such a doctrine has been revoked by statute, but 
under the facts of this case, whether or not there is a fraud, duress or 
undue influence exception may be of little importance. That is, Mr. 
Sieverts has not alleged, nor has he shown any evidence of, duress or 
undue influence. In a manner not dissimilar to his arguments and factual 
allegations in connection with his Rule 60(b) Motion in the divorce, Mr. 
Sieverts does talk about manipulation and fraud in one form or another, 
but in fact he identifies no action by the mother that would support a 
1
 Notably, Mr. Sieverts has not urged any deficiency in the Waiver document itself, and I 
conclude that he would be unable to successfully challenge that well-drafted document on its 
face. 
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fraud claim. Even taking as true Mr. Sieverts' claim that the mother 
promised to keep the Waiver in a safety deposit box, and not use it 
unless she needed to defeat a claim for custody by Mr. Sieverts, or in 
the event of her remarriage, and recognizing that the mother did, in 
fact, seek to use the document only nine days after it was signed, such 
action would not support a fraud allegation. 
That is, it is not material that the document was not kept in a 
safety deposit box. Even when the document was presented to Judge Peuler 
in the divorce action, it was presented for the sole purpose of recording 
the Consent to Relinquishment, but not for terminating rights at that 
time. The mother's position has been consistent throughout; namely, she 
wanted to bar any claim for child custody by Mr. Sieverts in the future, 
particularly in the event of her ill health, and she wanted to be free 
to marry and permit a future spouse to adopt the children. That is what 
Mr. Sieverts unequivocally consented to, and that is what is now-
occurring in both this action and apparently in the pending adoption 
matter. No presently existing material fact is even alleged to have been 
misrepresented by the mother on September 24, 2005, when Mr. Sieverts 
signed the Waiver and Relinquishment. 
For the foregoing reasons, I conclusively determine that there is 
no defense to the relinquishment based on fraud, duress or undue 
influence. The tentative portion of my present Ruling addresses more 
specifically the effect of the adoption statute regarding consent and 
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relinquishment in this stepparent adoption context. As noted, Section 
78-30-4.20, is brief and unequivocal: "A consent or relinquishment is 
effective when it is signed and may not be revoked." The difficulty with 
which I am struggling is both the legislature's statement of the rights 
and responsibilities of parties in adoption proceedings (Section 78-30-
4.12), and the conduct of the parties in this case over the last two 
years, which implicates to some degree the estoppel argument advanced by 
Mr. Sieverts' counsel. I link the two, because of the undisputed 
substantial involvement of Mr. Sieverts with the children over the past 
two years, and his assumption of financial responsibility (I am not 
determining at this time, neither do I need to, whether he is in full 
compliance with his child support obligations), which highlights the 
distinction between Mr. Sieverts, and the "unmarried biological father" 
referenced by the legislature. 
Specifically, all of the legislative "findings" set forth in Section 
78-30-4.12, appear to have nothing to do with a stepparent adoption, and 
nothing to do with the balancing of the rights and responsibilities of 
a mother and father who were married at the time of the children's birth 
and/or adoption (both of which are at issue in this case). It appears 
to me that there is at least an issue to be addressed whether Section 78-
30-4.12, and the associated legislation, including the revocation 
statute, were ever intended to be applicable to a circumstance such as 
the one before this Court. I am inviting careful briefing on this 
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subject, although I recognize the matter was touched upon in argument. 
I am specifically asking counsel to consider the questions of 
whether the Court should look behind the plain language of the statute 
and consider the intent. I am also asking counsel to address the issue 
of whether a statute that speaks of the inchoate interest of an unmarried 
biological father as triggering constitutional protection *only when he 
demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth," applies 
to render a two year old relinquishment irrevocable m the case of a 
previously married biological father who has assumed some, if not all, 
of the responsibilities, for his children both before the relinquishment 
and for the two succeeding years. I am also asking counsel to consider 
whether this Court has any obligation to consider the interests of the 
children in preserving a relationship with the natural father who is 
indisputably a part of their lives, all for the purpose of permitting a 
stepfather who will undoubtedly be a positive influence in their lives 
whether or not he is permitted, at this time, to adopt. 
I know these are difficult questions, and I regret delaying a final 
decision, but I am not comfortable resolving the matter without further 
briefing by counsel. I propose that both counsel submit additional 
briefing no later than Friday, November 16, 2 007, but if counsel agree 
to extend that date between them, I will accept any appropriate 
Stipulation. 
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Dated this 29ch day of October, 2007. 
ROBERT K'. HILDER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER 
On October 30, 2007, I issued a "Tentative Ruling and Request For Additional Briefing" 
wherein I requested further briefing on the application of Section 78-30-4.12, to the issue before 
me: a relinquishment by the natural father in the context of a stepparent adoption. Having 
received the supplemental briefing, I would like to express my appreciation to counsel for their 
efforts and to the parties for their continued patience; under these circumstances there is no 
decision more weighty than that of a relinquishment and termination of parental rights. Now, 
having thoroughly considered the parties' arguments, the adoption statute itself and the unique 
circumstances before me, for the reasons set forth herein, I deny the natural father, Mr. Brandon 
Sieverts', motion to reconsider the termination of his rights, based on his unequivocal Affidavit and 
Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father ("relinquishment"). 
1. The Relinquishment Petition, Affidavit & Statutes 
The framework for my analysis begins with both the terms of the relinquishment itself and 
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the related statutory provisions. On September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts executed a relinquishment 
petition and corresponding affidavit. In the affidavit, Mr. Sieverts attests that he signed the 
relinquishment "freely and voluntarily", absent any pressure or coercion and while not under the 
influence of any substance that would impair his ability to make decisions See, Relinquishment 
Aff. at fllf 10-12. Additionally, in the document Mr. Sieverts acknowledges that his relinquishment 
is "permanent and final" and recognizes that his signature waives "any and all rights'* to his children. 
IdL at ffll 6-8. Given his averments, I conclude that Mr. Sieverts acted with deliberate clarity and 
full knowledge of the relinquishments effect and the ramifications stemming therefrom. 
Next, I turn to two provisions found under the Adoption Chapter of the Code, §§ 78-30-4.12 
and 78-30-4.20. Section 78-30-4.12 entitled "[rjights and responsibilities of parties in adoption 
proceedings" states, 
[i]n enacting Sections 78-30-4.12 through 78-30-4.21 the Legislature 
prescribes the conditions for determining whether an unmarried 
biological father's action is sufficiently prompt and substantial 
to require constitutional protection. 
The second provision, entitled u[w]hen consent of relinquishment effective" states, 
[a] consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed 
and may not be revoked. 
UCA § 78-30-4.20. It is primarily the combined reading of these two provisions that has prompted 
my further consideration of the matter. Clearly, under the unequivocal language of the 
relinquishment statute, § 78-30-4.20, once a relinquishment is entered, it may not be reconsidered 
or revoked. The statute's plain terms do not distinguish between relinquishment by an unmarried 
biological father or relinquishment by a legal father such as Mr. Sieverts However, a reading of 
§ 78-30-4.12 seems to frame the provisions of sections 78-30-4.12 through 78-30-4.20, of which 
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the relinquishment statute is part, solely in the context of an unmarried biological father1. It is both 
§ 78-30-4.12's reference to an unmarried biological father and §§ 78-30-4.12 and 78-30-4.20's 
failure to address or encompass circumstances such as those before me (a legal father who was 
at the time of the children's birth and/or adoption married to the natural mother and who continues 
to be involved in the children's lives) that has given me pause and led to my request for additional 
research and briefing. I address each of my additional questions below. 
2. Statutory Interpretation 
My first question addresses whether I should look behind the plain language of the 
relinquishment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.20, to consider legislative intent in enacting 
these provisions; namely, applicability to a legal father who has continued involvement with his 
children. 
In Utah, principles of statutory interpretation require me to ttlook first to the statute's plain 
language with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent." Savage v. Utah 
Youth VilL 2004 UT 102,1f 18, 104 P.3d 1242. When the statutory language is clear it is not 
necessary to employ alternative interpretative tools. Adams v. Swensen. 2005 UT 8,^8,108 P.3d 
175. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, the court may "look beyond the statute to legislative 
history and public policy to ascertain the statute's intent." Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State. 
2006 UT 9, fl 59, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring). Applying principles of statutory 
interpretation to Section 78-30-4.20 , I find the statutory language unequivocal. The clear 
statement that a relinquishment cannot be revoked reveals no ambiguity that would trigger a need 
to look behind the plain language of the statute itself and consider legislative intent, 
'Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1.1(6) defines an "unmarried biological father11 as a 
person who "(a) is the biological father of a child; and (b) was not married to the 
biological mother of the child described in Subsection (6)(a) at the time of the child's: (I) 
conception; or (ii) birth." 
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Even if, however, I was to find the statute ambiguous, which I do not, a review of the 
adoption code reveals numerous sections that affect not only unmarried biological fathers, but the 
rights of various parties involved in adoption proceedings including the birth mother, married 
biological fathers, unmarried biological father, and guardians. See, UCA § 78-30-4.19(1) 
(addressing time period for a birth mother to consent); UCA § 78-30-4.21 (addressing when minor 
parent can consent to adoption. Minor parent may include birth mother, married father, or 
unmarried biological father); UCA §§ 78-30-4.13 and 78-30-4.14 (sections on notice and consent 
apply to birth mothers, married fathers, agencies, guardians, and unmarried biological fathers). 
Furthermore, a fundamental policy underlying the adoption code is the need for permanency 
and finality in order to minimize effort, expense and emotional involvement expended in the 
process. See, In re Adoption of F. 26 Utah 2d 255, 262, 488 P.2d 130, 134 (1971)(absent a 
guarantee of finality individuals may be more reluctant to adopt if a "consenting parent is permitted 
to arbitrarily charge [sic] her mind and revoke the consent"). Clearly, the underlying concerns for 
finality and permanency are applicable to the circumstances before me, and protracted cogitation 
of Mr. Sieverts' motion for reconsideration based on statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the 
underlying public policy in favor of finality. 
3. Statutory Application 
Concluding that there is no need to look beyond the plain language of the relinquishment 
statute obviates the need to further address my second question: whether Section 78-30-4.20 
applies to not only to an unmarried biological father but to a natural father who was married to the 
natural mother at the time of the adoption. 
4. Best Interests 
Again, my determination that it is inappropriate to look beyond the plain language of the 
statute is dispositive of my third question addressing whether I should explore application of the 
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best interest of the child standard. Moreover, analogizing this matter to a contested adoption, the 
best interest standard only arises if the court determines that consent has not been obtained.2 If 
consent is not obtained and there are not proper grounds to terminate parental rights, the court 
must dismiss the adoption petition. Only then may the court conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
determine custody based on a child's best interests3. Here, Mr. Sieverts* consent has clearly been 
obtained and there is no need for judicial inquiry into the best interests of the children.4 
5. Equitable Estoppel 
My next question stems from the estoppel arguments raised by Mr. Sieverts in his original 
brief; namely, whether petitioners should be estopped from enforcing Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment 
based upon their post-relinquishment conduct which includes continuing acceptance of his child 
support payments and allowing the children to have contact with Sieverts. First, I am inclined to 
agree with petitioners that if i determine that Mr. Sieverts has no present parental status or rights, 
he cannot obtain such rights by invoking an equitable doctrine. Nevertheless, because this 
conclusion may be seen as begging the question of whether Mr. Sieverts would never have 
surrendered his existing parental rights but for inconsistent acts or statements by the mother, I will 
address the equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims in more detail. 
The elements of equitable estoppel include, 
(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of 
such admission, statement or act, and (3) injury to such other party 
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement or act. 
2Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(1) and (2). 
3Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(2)(b): ulf there are not proper grounds to terminate the person's 
parental rights, the court shall: (iii) award custody of the child in accordance with the child's best interest." 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(2)(a): "If there are proper grounds to terminate the person's 
parental rights, the court shall order that the person's rights be terminated.* 
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Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
Applying the elements to the case before me, I find the doctrine of equitable estoppel does 
not prevent enforcement of Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment. Mr. Sieverts* estoppel claims are 
foreclosed by the lack of any evidence of inconsistent statements, acts or admissions by 
petitioners. To the contrary and as addressed in my prior ruling, the mother's position has been 
consistent throughout; seeking to bar any future claim for custody by Mr. Sieverts thereby allowing 
her the freedom to re-marry and permit a future spouse to adopt the children. Moreover, Mr. 
Sieverts has advanced no evidence or persuasive argument that he relied to his detriment upon 
petitioners1 alleged representations or actions when he signed his unequivocal relinquishment. 
Mr. Sieverts was aware of the relinquishment, and he is deemed to have understood the effects 
thereof. His actions and knowledge conclusively bar any claim that he reasonably relied on any 
acts or statements by te mother, to his detriment, in his post-relinquishment actions. 
In the alternative, Mr. Sieverts' suggests application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. 
Quasi-estoppel, often referred to as the doctrine of consistency, 
precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right 
inconsistent with a position [it has] previously taken. The doctrine 
applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain 
a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from which he 
accepted a benefit. 
Bott v. J.R. Shea Company. 299 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting, Stinnett v. Colorado 
Interstate Gas. Co.. 227 F.3d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 2000). Crucial under a theory of quasi estoppel is 
a finding that the estopped party has either "gained some advantage against the other party, 
produced a disadvantage to the other party, or the other party must have been induced to change 
positions.'1 C&G Inc v. Canyon Highway District .75 P.3d 194, 199 (Idaho 2003) (citing, Floyd v. 
Bd. of Commas of BonnevilleCountv. 52 P.3d 863, 871 (2002)); See also. Vessels v. Anschutz 
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Corp., 823 SW.2d 762, 766 (Tex. App. Tex. 1992) (writ denied) (finding quasi estoppel 
"inapplicable where conduct allegedly giving rise to the estoppel is not shown to have benefitted 
a party sought to be estopped")). Considering the record before me I find no indication that 
petitioners' post-relinquishment behavior has led to an advantage on their behalf or disadvantage 
to Mr. Sieverts. Thus, while Mr. Sieverts' continued, post-relinquishment contact is atypical, I do 
not find that it invokes principles of estoppel so as to defeat the plain language of the statute and 
the terms of the relinquishment itself. 
6. Conclusion 
I do not reach this conclusion lightly or without mindfulness of its effects on Mr. Sieverts, 
the petitioners and the four minor children. Although when enacting the relinquishment statute the 
legislature may not have had the present circumstances in mind, the statute created is ultimately 
broad enough to cover just this situation and for that reason I am constrained by its dictates. Mr. 
Sieverts' relinquishment was effective when signed on September 24, 2005, and it may not be 
revoked. While equity may be invoked to protect a party from the unfairness of inconsistent 
positions, the elements of estoppel are not present in the facts before me. 
For these reasons, respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
RO6EF*TFHILDER \ ^ ^ V V f 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G ^ ^ f e ^ v ^ . / 
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